A 'new version' gravity model is used to estimate the effect of de facto exchange rate regimes, as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , on bilateral trade. The results indicate that, while participation in a common currency union is typically strongly 'protrade' -as first suggested by Rose (2000) -other exchange rate regimes which lower the exchange rate uncertainty and transactions costs associated with international trade between countries are significantly more pro-trade than the default regime of a 'double float'. They suggest that the direct and indirect effects of exchange rate regimes on uncertainty and transactions costs tend to outweigh the trade-diverting substitution effects. In addition, there is evidence that membership of different currency unions by two countries has pro-trade effects, which can be understood in terms of a large indirect effect on transactions costs. Tariff-equivalent monetary barriers associated with each of the exchange rate regimes are also calculated.
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Introduction
Research on the macroeconomic and growth effects of exchange rate regimes has tended to focus on issues of growth, inflation and stabilization (for example, Bailliu et al, 2003; Ghosh et al, 2003; and Husain et al, 2005) . Much less attention has been paid to the question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime matters for the volume of trade between countries. An exception is the recent line of research, ignited by a provocative paper by Andrew Rose in 2000, that has focussed on the contribution of currency unions in promoting trade. Rose's initial finding that membership of a currency union appears to have a very large positive effect on trade between countries has provided a major stimulus to empirical and theoretical work on gravity models of trade. Most of this has been concerned with 'shrinking' the size of Rose's initial estimates of the currency union effect which researchers (including Rose) found implausible. Rose himself has offered further empirical work in the area (notably Rose, 2001; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2002) , while the specific effect of currency union in Europe has been investigated by Barr, Breedon and Miles (2003) and Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) . Baldwin (2005) provides a useful critical survey of the empirical literature and a review of the theoretical developments.
However, currency unions represent only one possible exchange rate regime. Rose, 2003 2 ), and drawing on the theoretical analysis of the gravity model by van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and Mélitz (2003) , we estimate a 'new version' gravity model in which we identify the effect on the trade between pairs of countries of a wide range of bilateral exchange rate regimes, from membership of the same or of different currency unions, through pegging to the same or different anchor currencies, to managed floats and full floats. We find that exchange rate regimes which reduce exchange rate risk and transactions costs, including currency unions, do indeed have positive effects on trade, but we also obtain results which suggest that currency union membership and other arrangements have significant effects on the trade of third party countries. Our results enable us to produce a trade-weighted tariff-equivalent estimate of the full monetary barrier which is comparable to that found by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) , together with estimates of the tariff-equivalent barriers associated with other exchange rate regimes.
In section 2 we explain our basic methodology, which involves the estimation of what Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) call the 'new' version of the gravity model, together with a treatment of distance which draws on Mélitz (2003 Mélitz ( , 2005 . In section 3 we set out the methodology and data used to supplement this model with a specification of the exchange rate regimes between country pairs. In section 4 we present estimates of the effects on trade of the full menu of regimes over the fifty year period from 1948 to 1998
and for two sub-periods, 1948-72 and 1973-98 . Section 5 uses the results to calculate the tariff-equivalent effects of different exchange rate regimes. Section 6 concludes.
Basic methodology
In this section we first discuss some particular features of the basic model we are going to use, and then present empirical results on those features. Earlier work on currency unions in gravity models such as Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) 
where T ij is the flow of trade between country i and country j, 3 y i and y j are the respective GDPs, y W is global GDP, t ij is the bilateral trade resistance expressed as the trade cost factor which relates the prices paid by the consumer in one country to the price received by the producer in the other (and where equation (1) assumes symmetry in trade costs so that t ij = t ji ), σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between all goods (assumed to be greater than one so that there is a negative effect from bilateral trade costs on trade flows), and P i and P j are the respective CES consumer price indices for each country. The latter terms show the extent to which trade costs raise prices of goods in general to consumers in one country above the price received by firms in that and all other countries, and are denoted 'multilateral trade resistance'. 4 They depend on all the trade cost factors for each country's trade with itself and all other countries, and take the form ( )
where p i is the price received by exporters in country i and β i is the distribution parameter in the utility function. 5 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) derive comparable results for a model in which each country produces a product within each product class.
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The trade cost factors can in turn be regarded as functions of a group of continuous variables(see Mélitz, 2003) , notably some measure of distance, on the one hand, and population and land area (reflecting the ease of domestic rather than international trade) on the other; and a group of 0-1 dummy variables covering, for example, whether two countries have a common border, their prior and existing colonial relations, and whether they have some particular trade arrangement or exchange rate regime between them.
Empirical estimation of this model has to take account of the fact that P i and P j are not observable. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) directly solve for P i and P j in terms of the observable determinants of the trade barrier and then estimate (1) directly using nonlinear estimation techniques. An alternative, adopted by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Mélitz (2003) and used in this paper, includes country fixed effects in a standard regression as proxies for multilateral trade resistance. The country fixed effects capture the common element in each country's trade with every other country, which is precisely the notion of multilateral trade resistance.
6
The issue of distance has been investigated in more detail by Mélitz (2003 Mélitz ( , 2005 {Ci} is a set of country fixed effects.
In order to build up towards this full model we first consider the introduction of country fixed effects as proxies for multilateral trade resistance. Table 1 presents, in columns 1 and 2, the results of a basic regression of bilateral trade on absolute distance, log product of real GDP, log product of population, log product of area and time dummies, and with and without country fixed effects. It is clear that the fixed effects add significantly to the explanatory power of the equation, as the adjusted R-squared rises from 0.62 to 0.70. At the same time the coefficient estimate for log product of real GDP falls from 1.33 to 0.82 while that for log product of population rises (absolutely) from -0.42 to -0.79. On the other hand, since the log product of land area is perfectly collinear with the country fixed effects, it does not enter the regression in column 2. In the light of this statistical evidence, as well as the previous theoretical argument, we include country fixed effects (and exclude land area) from now on.
[ Table 1 near here]
In column 3 we introduce the standard set of controls used by Rose and others, i.e. those from Lang to GSP in the above list. It is clear that they also add to the explanatory power without greatly disturbing the other coefficients; the adjusted R-squared rises from 0.70 to 0.71. As expected, those variables which correlate perfectly with the country fixed effects, namely, Landl and Island are dropped from these and subsequent regressions.
In column 4 we replace Rose's data for absolute distance by relative distance as advocated by Mélitz. This change makes very little difference to any of the coefficient estimates and the adjusted R-squared remains unchanged at 0.71. 8 However, in the light of the theoretical argument for relative rather than absolute distance, and its relation to bilateral versus multilateral trade resistance, we retain relative distance and use this model as the baseline specification for the remainder of the paper.
Adding exchange rate regimes
We now build on this baseline by controlling for the exchange rate arrangements between countries, drawing primarily on Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) had to make judgments about the transition from currency boards to hard pegs for a range of ex-colonies, and here we relied in part on information given in Page (1993) . We were also able to allocate the very small number of cases of Reinhart and Rogoff's category 15
into one or other of our four categories. Table 2 shows the correspondence between
Reinhart and Rogoff's 15 and our four categories.
[ Table 2 near here]
Next, we define a vector of mutually exclusive 0-1 dummy variables so as to distinguish on a country pair basis between regimes such as (a) two countries use the same currency in a currency union and/or as the anchor for a currency board (dummy variable SAMECU = 1), in which case there is zero uncertainty and near-zero transactions costs involved in trade between them; 13 (b) two countries peg to the same currency (SAMEPEG = 1), in which case there is some uncertainty and definite transactions costs; (c) both countries' exchange rates float but are managed with reference to the same anchor currency (SAMEMANREF = 1), in which case there is more uncertainty and probably higher transactions costs (from wider spreads); (d) cases where one country has a pegged and 11 another a managed currency (without a specific reference currency) (PEGMAN = 1); and so on. The matrix in Table 3 is a simple way of identifying the different possible regimes;
in each of the cells in the first three rows there are two regimes to cover when countries refer (more or less strictly) to the same currency (in the north-west corner of the cell) and when they refer to different currencies (in the south-east corner). Table 4 gives the full specification, together with the distribution of observations across regimes.
[ Tables 3 and 4 near here]
The default exchange rate regime is where both countries have a freely floating currency.
Our prior expectations for the various dummies are as follows. On the basis of the existing literature on the effect of currency unions within gravity models we expect countries in the same currency union/currency board to have significantly higher trade than those in the default regime, so that SAMECU should be positive. We expect countries which peg to the same currency to have somewhat higher trade, ceteris paribus, since the exchange rate uncertainty is less than in the default regime but there are significant transactions costs, so that SAMEPEG should be positive but smaller than SAMECU. We expect countries which manage their currencies with reference to the same currency to have a smaller improvement in external trade, so that SAMEMANREF would be positive but smaller again. For exchange rate regimes which cross categories or involve different anchors, pegs or reference currencies there are three different effects, so that the sign is not obvious. First, the exchange rate regime between two countries may affect their trade through its direct effects on uncertainty and transactions costs. Second, the regime may affect their trade by encouraging one country to substitute it by trade with a third country with which it has a 'closer' exchange rate regime. And third, the regime may affect trade via an indirect effect on transactions costs, where a country which trades with more than one user of a single currency, or (to a lesser extent) more than one country pegging to a vehicle currency, can economise on working balances in the single or the vehicle currency. For example, where one country is in a currency union/currency board with an anchor to which the other pegs, the common anchor/peg should reduce uncertainty (relative to the default regime) and insofar as it trades with other members of the union the pegging country should be able to economise on working balances, both of which effects would increase trade; on the other hand, the country in the currency union may substitute trade with its currency union partner(s) instead of trade with the same-peg country, which would reduce trade. Thus the sign of SAMECUPEG is not clear a priori.
Similarly, where two countries peg to different currencies, the existence of pegs may enable both countries to economise on working balances in the vehicle currencies, but there may be substitution effects in favour of trade with same-peg countries; so the sign of DIFFPEG is also not clear a priori. Scanning the table along one row or one column enables the reader to see the effect of varying one country's regime while holding the other's constant. And scanning along the diagonal towards the CU/CU cell at the top right shows the effect of keeping both countries' regimes the same but varying them both.
Results
[ Table 6 near here]
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A number of clear patterns emerge from Table 6 . First, from the CU column it is clear that SAMECU > SAMECUPEG > SAMECUMAN > CUMAN > 0 > CUFLOAT. This suggests strongly that (except in the case where the other currency is floating) there is no significant trade diversion from membership of a currency union, a result which has also been obtained in more general terms by other researchers, e.g. Micco et al. (2003) .
Second, it is also clear that membership of different currency unions has a strong positive effect on trade, even though the effect itself is only about one third as large as when the two countries are members of the same currency union. Indeed, in Table 6 An obvious concern about estimates based on the full period from 1948 to 1998 is that they may be unduly influenced by the very specific features of the Bretton Woods era.
Not only were most industrial and many other countries pegged to the dollar during this time, but also for most of the period many developing countries were subject to the dictates of the colonial powers (under whose authority many of the currency boards 15 operating in this period had been established), and it was only in the late 1960s that these latter countries acquired political independence and with it a degree of autonomy over their choice of exchange rate regime. To investigate the robustness of our full-sample estimates we therefore split the sample at 1972 and re-estimate the core regression over the two sub-samples. The results are reported in the right-hand columns of Table 5 and summarised in Tables 6(b) and (c). This reveals a number of interesting features. First, there is some variation in the principal control variables, with the coefficients on log product of GDP and log of population absolutely higher in the first sub-period and lower in the second, while that on the log of relative distance varies in the opposite direction.
Of greater interest in this paper, however, are the variations in the coefficients on the main exchange rate regime coefficients, and here two features are striking. The first is that the coefficients are generally somewhat smaller in the later than the earlier subperiod, but the second is that the relative rankings within the sub-periods are relatively stable and those for the second sub-period correlate more closely with the full-sample estimates. 15 From the CU column, for example, we observe the same SAMECU > SAMECUPEG > SAMECUMAN > CUMAN > 0 > CUFLOAT pattern as for the overall period, and the extension to DIFFCU suggests something like a U-shaped curve in the later, but not the earlier, sub-period. From rows 2 and 3 of the table it is clear that, as for the full sample, SAMECUPEG > SAMEPEG and SAMECUMAN > SAMEPEGMAN, but the rankings in row 4 (or 6) for CUMAN, PEGMAN, MANREFMAN and MANMAN are less clear cut. The rankings for regimes with differences in currency/anchor/reference also vary widely; in particular DIFFCU is small and insignificant in the earlier, but large and significant in the later, sub-period.
In thinking about these variations across sub-periods there are a number of points worth making. First, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s involved moves to free or managed floats by the major industrial countries and much higher volatility of exchange rates and other asset prices than in previous or subsequent decades;
by the late 1970s many developing countries had also adopted much more flexible regimes, sometimes in the context of high or even hyper-inflation. From the 1980s, as the industrialised countries took more decisive action to reduce their own inflation rates, asset price volatility began to subside and the European countries in particular moved towards greater exchange rate fixity, and in the 1990s developing country inflation rates also generally came down, with flexible exchange rates in many countries being replaced by harder (but not generally completely hard) exchange rate regimes. These changes are broadly reflected in our data (Table 4) , which show a lower number of regimes including pegs in the later sub-period. All in all, then, the later sub-period is a time of greater underlying economic instability and much greater variation, across years and across countries, in exchange rate regimes. Finally, while in the earlier sub-period there were substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers between industrialised countries and pervasive 'imperial preferences' between colonies and colonial masters, the former were much lower in the later sub-period and the latter largely disappeared. It seems likely therefore that tariff and non-tariff barriers (which are captured in our control variables only to a limited extent through Regional and GSP) were strongly and positively associated with currency union and pegged regimes in the earlier sub-period, generating an upward bias to the relevant coefficients, but were much less so in the later sub-period.
These points suggest that while the overall patterns are relatively constant, the changes in rankings and in the relative size of the estimated coefficients between sub-periods may be explained, at least in part, in terms of changes in the overall international environment within which trade was taking place and whose characteristics are imperfectly controlled for in our analysis. There is scope for more detailed analysis of the variations over time, which we leave for future work, but it is clear that the later sub-period provides a better guide than the earlier to the current importance of different exchange rate regimes. It is also worth noting at this point that Micco et al. (2003) interpreted the relatively small currency union effect which they found for the EMU countries as indicating that the currency union effect is smaller for developed countries than for the developing countries which are prominent in Rose's datasets. The present findings suggest that Micco et al.
may also have been picking up a smaller effect because currency unions had a generally smaller impact in the later period.
In general our results suggest that there is a graduated effect by which greater exchange rate fixity and lower transactions costs encourage trade. The effect of currency unions on trade, on which the literature has concentrated, turns out to be the strongest, but other regimes which imply more uncertainty and larger transactions costs relative to currency union, but less than in the default regime of a double float, also promote trade. In addition, the possible trade-diverting effect of 'closer' exchange rate regimes -the second of the three effects identified above -seems to be outweighed by the two trade-promoting effects. This is surely the obvious explanation for the positive and significant results for the DIFFCU regime in the overall period and the later sub-period: the direct effect of this regime (relative to the default) must be negative or zero at best (since the unions are floating against each other), the substitution effect on trade must be negative, but the indirect effect on transactions cost must be positive and could be large, in cases where the two unions are themselves large and the two countries trade widely with members of the other union.
One further issue raised in the literature in this area is that of endogeneity: it could well be that countries with large amounts of trade between them tend to enter into currency unions in order to stabilise that trade, rather than that the adoption of unions acts to stimulate trade. Researchers who consider only currency unions, such as Barr et al. (2003) , have used instrumental variables to check for endogeneity and found that it is not important. In our setup, with 21 different exchange rate regimes (including the default), finding strong valid instruments would be much more difficult. However, our results suggest that endogeneity cannot be the dominant explanation, for in the later sub-period countries were choosing their exchange rate regime more freely but trade flows were less strongly associated with currency union and other pro-trade regimes.
The tariff equivalent of different currency barriers
The previous two sections have presented a wealth of empirical results. These can be conveniently summarized by expressing the estimated barrier to trade represented by each exchange rate arrangement in tariff equivalent terms, relative to the barrier-free case which is here represented by the same currency union category (SAMECU). From the log-linearised version of equation (1) μ is that part of the trade cost factor for trade between countries i and j associated with exchange rate regime h (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) ). The tariff equivalent in percentage terms is then ( h ij μ -1)*100. Table 7 presents the calculations based on the estimated coefficients reported in Table 5 for the whole period, 1948-98, and for the two sub-periods, on the basis of two different estimates of the elasticity of substitution, first σ = 5, which is used by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) , and second σ = 8, which seems to be the preferred estimate of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) . The results are arranged in the rank order of the coefficients for the full sample period; it should be noted that not all of these numbers are derived from statistically significant estimates in Table 5 .
[ Table 7 near here]
For the whole period our calculation of the full barrier, given in the table by the default regime, is 29.4% for σ = 5 and 15.8% for σ = 8; the former can be compared with Rose and van Wincoop's 26%. These barriers are reduced by exchange rate regimes which restrict the volatility of the exchange rate between two countries and/or decrease the costs of international transactions. In the σ = 8 case, for example, the barrier is reduced to 12.5% where two countries peg to the same anchor, to 11.4% when they are each members of different currency unions, and 5.6% when one is using in a currency union/currency board the currency to which the other is pegged. Some regimes constitute an even bigger obstacle to trade than the 'full barrier' implied by the double float (because their coefficients are negative, in some cases significantly so), notably those in 20 which at least one country floats or manages its currency without a specific reference.
The trade-weighted average tariff equivalent across the full range of exchange rate arrangements is 27.5% for σ = 5 and approximately 15% for σ = 8.
For 1948-72 the corresponding magnitudes are slightly larger, and for 1973-98 they are slightly smaller. The 'full barrier', as given by the default regime, is 34.3% for σ = 5 and 18.4% for σ = 8 for the earlier sub-period, and 21.6% and 11.8% respectively for the later sub-period. Here the ranking of regimes by the size of the barriers is a little different; as noted earlier, the ranking for the later sub-period is closer to that for the overall period, and the barrier associated with membership of different currency unions is higher in the first and much lower in the second sub-period.
These disaggregated estimates allow us to place Rose's original estimate of the currency union effect and Rose and Wincoop's estimate of the monetary barrier in context. In both cases their estimates are derived from an exercise in which only the currency union exchange rate regime is identified, and the default includes all other regimes. Such estimates are often understood implicitly as applying to the adoption of a currency union from the starting point of any other exchange rate regime. But our work shows it is important to differentiate. For example, the move from EMS to EMU was a move from SAMEPEG to SAMECU for trade between the countries concerned, and on our overall results that move reduces the monetary barrier by 12.5% rather than the full 15.8% (for σ = 8). Similarly, for Denmark to move now from pegging to the euro (SAMECUPEG) to adopting the euro (SAMECU) would reduce the monetary barrier to its trade with the eurozone only by 5.6%.
Conclusions
In this paper we have integrated a full set of bilateral exchange rate regimes into an existing large dataset and used the 'new' version gravity model to estimate the size of the 2 Together with many other researchers in this field, we are very grateful to Rose for making his datasets available for download from his website. We are also grateful to Jacques Mélitz for making available his distance data.
3 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) define the left hand side variable as the exports from one country to the other, but as Mélitz (2003) points out there is nothing to distinguish between exports and imports. 4 These price indices are crucially absent from the traditional version of the gravity equation, and the implied adjustments to them are essential for obtaining proper predictions of the effects of changes in exchange rate regimes. 5 In the case of domestic trade it is assumed that the trade cost factor, e.g. t jj , is equal to unity.
6 See also Feenstra (2004, pp. 161-2) : 'Since the fixed-effects method produces consistent estimates of the average border effect across countries, and is easy to implement, it might be considered to be the preferred estimator.' 7 The main sources for the data are IMF and World Bank publications and the CIA's World Factbook. See Rose (2003) for further details. The original dataset includes 1999, but we omit this because, given the evidence from Micco, Ordoñez and Stein (2003) that the impact on trade of European monetary union is gradual, we want to exclude the 23 incomplete effect of the first year of that development. The dataset is more complete for the later years than for the earlier years.
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As Mélitz (2005) notes, however, in the presence of country-fixed effects the conventional distance measure is, in fact, a measure of relative distance. Were we estimating the model over a fully balanced panel of data, therefore, the coefficients on log distance and log relative distance in columns (3) and (4) would be identical (as would all the other coefficients with the exception of those on the country fixed effects). The fact that the coefficients differ by small amounts in this case reflects the way in which we computed remoteness. Our measure is computed for the unbalanced sample as a whole across all years (i.e. across all countries that were ever included) rather than each year over the countries involved in trade that year. and custrict is 1 in some post-independence years when, according to Reinhart and Rogoff and other sources, some of the colonial currency board arrangements became pegs rather than currency boards.
14 It should be noted that the very large number of observations means that it is in some sense 'easy' for a variable to appear statistically significant in this exercise. What matters is the absolute size of the currency effects. 15 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 0.80 for the earlier and 0.96 for the later sub-period. .Note: the total number of observations for each period/sub-period in the final three columns is 225,518, 60,864 and 164,654 respectively. DIFF 9 CU 0.33* Key: SAME = both countries have same currency/anchor/reference; DIFF = each country has different currency/anchor/reference; NO = no anchor/reference; CU = currency union/currency board; peg = pegged exchange rate; ref = managed exchange rate with specific reference; man = managed with no specific reference; flex = flexible exchange rate.
